

SPRING **2016** EVALUATION FINDINGS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

# National Campaign to Reform State Juvenile Justice Systems and the National Communications Effort

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# FOREWORD

The MacArthur Foundation is pleased to have been part of a group of funders that collaborated to support the National Campaign to Reform State Juvenile Justice Systems, thereby helping to advance juvenile justice reforms in thirty states across the country.

The Foundation has funded work in juvenile justice since 1996, when the MacArthur Research Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice was launched. At a time when it seemed the original ideal of a separate justice system for young people was imperiled by a wave of punitive legislation targeting youth crime, our support enabled researchers to conduct a series of high-profile studies establishing the profound developmental differences between adolescents and adults. In 2004, seeking to translate these findings into justice policy and practice, we began the Models for Change initiative, a long-term effort to support developmentally appropriate policy and practice reform in a small number of bellwether states. The National Campaign to Reform State Juvenile Justice Systems, launched six years later, was aimed at capitalizing on reform momentum and spreading it more broadly. Working in states identified as offering realistic opportunities to achieve sustainable legislative and policy change, the National Campaign provided advocates and officials with the strategic resources they needed to advance bipartisan reform agendas, including expertise in communications, policy analysis and government affairs.

Importantly, the Foundation's work focused on reform efforts which, in some cases, included changes in legislation. In light of lobbying restrictions applicable to private foundations, MacArthur was careful to ensure that the grants it made complied with the applicable lobbying laws. This evaluation focuses on one aspect of the reform efforts and evaluates the impact the grantees had with respect to legislative changes within the permitted constraints of the law.

The Foundation is gratified by the results achieved by the National Campaign, which in five years of work succeeded in advancing tangible juvenile justice reforms in thirty states. These included measures to ensure that young people are processed in juvenile court rather than criminal court, increased use of diversion and community-based programs in lieu of incarceration, improvements in conditions of confinement, increased access to counsel, and policies that prevent school behavior from leading to justice involvement.

We recognize the constraints of a time-limited campaign strategy, as highlighted in this evaluation, and particularly the possibility that gains achieved with the help of the National Campaign could be lost once those resources are withdrawn. In supporting future efforts of this kind, we will give more thought to the issue of sustainability, and to what it takes to build permanent local capacity to defend reforms achieved.

**Julia Stasch**

President, MacArthur Foundation

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This independent evaluation was commissioned by the MacArthur Foundation.  
Its contents do not necessarily represent the views of the Foundation.

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## Background, Goals, and Approach

For two decades, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation invested significantly in juvenile justice work in the United States. The Foundation's entry into the field was prompted by policy changes that threatened to erase the boundaries between juvenile and criminal justice. Evidence about the profound developmental differences between adolescents and adults underpinned the Foundation's Models for Change initiative, which it launched in 2003. Models for Change was a \$121 million effort to bring about changes in law, policy, and practice, and to provide models for juvenile justice reform. Ultimately, Models for Change was active in 16 states.<sup>1</sup>

Six years into the Models for Change initiative, the MacArthur Foundation considered three possible scenarios: 1) secure its investment, phasing out Models for Change; 2) expand its current strategy, building on Models for Change incrementally, engaging more states, and creating more examples of successful reform; or 3) capitalize on the momentum underway, launching a multi-state campaign across the country aimed at changing juvenile justice policy. In reviewing these options, the MacArthur Foundation proposed capitalizing on the momentum underway. It saw a unique alignment of social, economic, and political factors for improving juvenile justice policies nationally and an opportunity to collaborate with other funders and government agencies to speed up the adoption of practices that would make states' juvenile justice systems fairer.<sup>2</sup>

### *National Campaign*

The timing was deemed right to take bolder action, and the MacArthur Foundation's long-term aim was to help support the "next wave" of reforms across the country. With that opportunity in mind, M+R Strategic Services (M+R) conducted an assessment to determine what a campaign to reform the nation's juvenile justice systems would entail. This information-gathering process included interviews with experts in the field of juvenile justice reform and individuals involved with Models for Change. Based on the findings from the assessment, in the spring of 2010, M+R proposed a five-year campaign to work in 40 states. **The main goal of the multi-state campaign was to enact meaningful juvenile justice reforms—that would save money, improve public safety, lower recidivism, keep young people out of the juvenile justice system, and increase alternatives to incarceration—in 75% of the targeted states.**

In its assessment in 2010, M+R concluded that there was little consensus among experts in the field about the juvenile justice priorities for each state to address and that a "big-tent" approach was needed to broaden and strengthen the constituency supporting juvenile justice reforms. Based on these and other conclusions from M+R's research, the MacArthur Foundation engaged other funders and led the formation of the Juvenile Justice Funders' Collaborative. The Funders' Collaborative, housed at Public Interest Projects,<sup>3</sup> hired M+R to manage the National Campaign to Reform State Juvenile Justice Systems (National Campaign). In addition to the MacArthur Foundation, which was the primary funder, the Funders' Collaborative included: the Edward S. Moore Family

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<sup>1</sup> More information about the MacArthur Foundation's juvenile justice strategy and grantmaking priorities can be found at [www.macfound.org/programs/juvenile\\_justice/strategy](http://www.macfound.org/programs/juvenile_justice/strategy).

<sup>2</sup> Source: The Discussion Paper on a National Campaign for Juvenile Justice Systems Reform, June 2010, pages 5-6.

<sup>3</sup> Public Interest Projects is now NEO Philanthropy.

Foundation, the Gund Foundation, the Interact Foundation, the New York Community Trust, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the Sapelo Foundation, and Wellspring. The MacArthur Foundation's total investment in the National Campaign between 2011 and 2015 was \$18,050,000. Additional contributions came from members of the Funders' Collaborative and other sources, bringing the total budget closer to \$5 to \$7 million annually. In 2016, the MacArthur Foundation provided a grant to the Rockefeller Family Fund to support a final year of operations for the National Campaign. Under its Juvenile Justice Fund, the Rockefeller Family Fund retained M+R to develop and execute the final year of a public policy campaign to bring about significant juvenile justice systems reform in up to 15 states across the country.<sup>4</sup>

To achieve the ambitious goal of enacting meaningful juvenile justice reforms in 75% of the targeted states over a five-year period, M+R, in collaboration with the MacArthur Foundation and Funders' Collaborative, developed and implemented a National Campaign consisting of three components:

**1 |** Conducting assessments to identify states to work in that offered realistic opportunities to achieve reform. State selection criteria used by the National Campaign included the availability of champions and allies, the policy climate, and local organizations' capacity and receptivity.<sup>5</sup>

**2 |** Assembling state-based teams of local advocates, judges, law enforcement officials, and others to identify the parts of the juvenile justice system that needed change the most and to determine the reform agendas.

**3 |** Providing strategic, logistical, and financial resources to achieve each state's reform goals. This usually included hiring seasoned government affairs professionals, communications experts, and policy analysts to work with local juvenile justice advocates, elected officials, and policymakers to shape and advance agendas that hold youth accountable for their actions, provide rehabilitation, improve public safety, lower recidivism rates, and assist youth and their families.

The approach was designed to enable the National Campaign to be practical and nimble, build bipartisan support for juvenile justice reforms, and generate successive waves of state policy reforms that would create momentum for new and stronger reforms throughout the country. Although the overall approach remained consistent, each year National Campaign staff at M+R crafted proposals that detailed activities and adjustments to campaign operations. The annual proposals were presented to the Funders' Collaborative for review and approval.

In light of lobbying restrictions applicable to private foundations, the MacArthur Foundation was careful to ensure that its grants complied with the applicable lobbying laws. Under the law, the Foundation could provide project support to charitable organizations that might lobby if the Foundation received a budget that reflected a breakdown between the non-lobbying expenses of the project and any lobbying expenses, the Foundation's grant was less than the non-lobbying expenses, and none of the Foundation's funds were earmarked for lobbying. Alternatively, the MacArthur Foundation could prohibit grantees from using its funds to lobby, but grantees could use other funds to participate in lobbying activities within the legally accepted limits.

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<sup>4</sup> Source: Rockefeller Family Fund grant brief, June 16, 2016, page 1.

<sup>5</sup> Each year the state selections were presented to and approved by the Funders' Collaborative.

## *National Communications Effort*

A year into the National Campaign, M+R proposed a complementary national communications strategy.<sup>6</sup> Models for Change had produced best practices and tools to help advocates and practitioners advance systemic reform, and the National Campaign sought to make those reforms a reality. However, despite the early success of the National Campaign and the legacy of Models for Change, juvenile justice reform had yet to become a mainstream cause. The MacArthur Foundation was interested in pursuing a parallel communications effort that would complement various juvenile justice initiatives and help successfully position a “Fourth Wave of Juvenile Justice Reform.”<sup>7</sup>

After a thorough planning process in 2012, a National Communications Effort<sup>8</sup> implemented by M+R got underway in 2013. The MacArthur Foundation, in consultation with the National Campaign, decided to make the National Communications Effort complementary to the National Campaign rather than connected to it. This decision reflected the concern that a national, foundation-backed communications effort could potentially hurt rather than help some reform efforts, especially given the difference state to state in existing policy, politics, and the reforms pursued. Therefore, the National Communications Effort sought to shape and elevate a national conversation, separate from the National Campaign’s work in the states, that would generate awareness of, and support for, juvenile justice reform so that more states would feel pressure to advance or sustain juvenile justice reforms. **The National Communications Effort translated this objective into two specific communications goals: 1) to raise awareness among people who should care about young people touched by the system (and could do something to improve their outcomes) and 2) to work with advocates in ways that would highlight available solutions and could benefit or complement their reform work.**

The National Communications Effort was an experimental undertaking to reach an audience beyond the community of advocates and practitioners working to advance reform. Targeting people who would or should care about policies that hurt young people, the National Communications Effort’s primary audiences were young adults, ages 18 to 24 years, and parents, ages 35 to 50 years. Additionally, through its work with advocates, the National Communications Effort sought to reach a secondary audience of policymakers and practitioners. Throughout the duration of the National Communications Effort, the goals and target audiences remained consistent. However, as an endeavor to learn how communications could seed broader support for juvenile justice reform, the National Communications Effort regularly reviewed its progress and made adjustments to its approach to account for lessons learned along the way. The Foundation’s investment in the National Communications Effort, \$1,800,000, was modest compared to the National Campaign.

## Learning Objectives, Information-Gathering Process, and Analysis

### *National Campaign*

The main purpose of the evaluation was to determine how effective the National Campaign was in achieving legislative<sup>9</sup> and policy change in state juvenile justice systems and to answer one overarching question: Has the

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<sup>6</sup> Sources: The 2012 proposal to Public Interest Projects submitted in the fall of 2011. M+R provided more detail about the potential communications strategy in a memorandum to the MacArthur Foundation in November 2011.

<sup>7</sup> The four waves of juvenile justice reform are characterized as: 1) 1899 and early twentieth century: individualized treatment and rehabilitation, 2) 1960s: due process protections, 3) 1990s: punitive backlash; 2000 and beyond: public safety, accountability, and positive outcomes for youth. Source: The Fourth Wave Juvenile Justice Reforms for the Twenty-First Century (short version), March 13, 2013, page 3.

<sup>8</sup> In materials developed by M+R, this effort is also referred to as the Communications Campaign or Public Relations Campaign.

<sup>9</sup> The evaluation of the National Campaign focused on these types of reforms and the impact that the National Campaign had with respect to legislative changes within the permitted constraints of the law applicable to private foundations.

National Campaign contributed to the sought after “next wave” of reform in juvenile justice? The evaluation design addressed four areas of inquiry and a series of learning questions about outcomes, contexts, strategy in action, and implications. The information-gathering process and analysis involved to develop the final report included the following elements:

- One-on-one and small-group interviews with MacArthur Foundation staff, National Campaign staff at M+R, funders, juvenile justice advocates, and observers of the field
- Site visits to nine states where campaigns were active in 2013, 2014, or 2015 (three were chosen to represent each year): Arkansas, Kansas, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New York, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, Washington
- Two rounds of surveys (one in 2014 and one in 2015) of juvenile justice reform stakeholders in 36 of 37 states that the National Campaign worked in from 2011 to 2015
- A comprehensive review of materials developed in association with the National Campaign, including strategy and planning documents
- Analysis of M+R’s self-reported data, tracking mechanisms, and progress reports, complemented by some independent policy research to corroborate M+R’s reports


### *National Communications Effort*

This evaluation’s principal focus was to determine if and how the National Communications Effort shaped and elevated a narrative that reached its target audiences and increased their understanding and support for juvenile justice reform. More broadly, the evaluation also examined the ways in which a complementary, experimental communications strategy could help support and sustain a movement of juvenile justice reform. Additionally, the MacArthur Foundation expressed a desire to know whether the National Communications Effort had an impact on policy reform and the broader media landscape, even though these were not objectives or intended outcomes of the National Communications Effort. In response, the evaluation methodology included the following elements:

- Comprehensive review of strategy and planning documents developed for the National Communications Effort, M+R’s self-reported data on benchmarks and metrics, and progress reports
- Message penetration and saturation analysis of media coverage and Twitter conversations generated by the National Communications Effort
- Message penetration and saturation analysis of national media coverage and Twitter conversations about juvenile justice
- Review and analysis of demographic data of Facebook users who followed the Mistakes Kids Make page or clicked on Mistakes Kids Make ads
- Compilation and analysis of self-reported biographical information from Twitter users who Tweeted about the National Communications Effort or the media coverage generated by the National Communications Effort
- Compilation and analysis of quotes by 11 National Communications Effort spokespeople in media from 2011 to 2015 to assess changes in their media profiles and influence
- In-depth qualitative review of media coverage and Twitter conversations related to three “breakthrough moments” per year in the national landscape from 2011 to 2015
- One-on-one interviews with nine stakeholders involved with the National Communications Effort in 2013, including juvenile justice partners, state-based advocates, affinity groups, and M+R staff
- Analysis of reports developed and released by the National Communications Effort, including a qualitative review of media coverage secured for each

## National Campaign: Results

From 2011 through 2015, the National Campaign supported state campaigns in 37 states. It retained 55 lobby firms, 41 policy and state campaign coordinators, 16 public affairs and communications professionals, and it invested in six research and polling projects to advance each state's unique reform agenda. In total, over the course of five years, 127 legislative bills, budgets, and Supreme Court Rules supported by the National Campaign were adopted, and approximately 208 reforms were enacted and regressive measures defeated. More detailed results are included in the illustration and tables that follow.



States the National Campaign Worked in Each Year				
	New States (Goal)	New States (Actual)	Continued State Activity	Actual # of States Worked In
2011	8 to 10 <sup>10</sup>	7		7
2012	8 to 10 <sup>11</sup>	7	6	13
2013	7 to 10 <sup>12</sup>	7	11	18
2014	7 to 10 <sup>13</sup>	9	16	25
2015	7 to 10 <sup>14</sup>	7	24	31
<b>TOTAL:</b>				<b>37</b>

<sup>10</sup> Proposal for a Campaign to Reform Juvenile Justice Systems for Public Interest Projects (2011), October 18, 2010, page 3.

<sup>11</sup> Proposal for a Campaign to Reform Juvenile Justice Systems for Public Interest Projects (2012), September 2011, pages 6-7.

<sup>12</sup> Proposal for a Campaign to Reform Juvenile Justice Systems for Public Interest Projects (2013), August 24, 2012, page 4.

<sup>13</sup> Proposal for a Campaign to Reform Juvenile Justice Systems for Public Interest Projects (2014), September 4, 2013, page 4.

<sup>14</sup> Proposal for a Campaign to Reform Juvenile Justice Systems for Public Interest Projects (2015), September 4, 2014, page 5.

Enacted Juvenile Justice Reforms, Legislation Adopted, and Regressive Measures Defeated					
	Reform Goals	Reforms Enacted and Regressive Measures Defeated (Actual) <sup>15</sup>	Reforms and Bills Not Enacted <sup>15</sup>	% Successful	Enacted Legislation, Budgets, and Supreme Court Rules
2011	24	22	2	94%	13
2012	25	20	5	80%	8
2013	58	39	19	67%	29
2014	77	55	22	71%	29
2015	129	72	57	56%	48
<b>TOTALS:</b>	<b>313</b>	<b>208</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>66%</b>	<b>127</b>

## National Communications Effort: Results

Over the course of three years, the National Communications Effort secured more than 1.4 billion media impressions, generated more than 900,000 social media interactions, created the largest Facebook community dedicated to juvenile justice with 45,450 followers, produced and released six major reports and an interactive online storytelling project, and developed communications assets and capabilities for more than a dozen juvenile justice organizations. More detailed results are included in the following tables.

Media Impressions and Online Interactions						
	Media Impressions (Goal)	Media Impressions (Actual)	Online Interactions (Goal)	Online Interactions (Actual)	Facebook Followers (Goal)	Facebook Followers (Actual)
2013	11M	81M	500K	343K	40K	11K
2014	150M	820M	250K	275K	n/a <sup>16</sup>	29K
2015	190M	229M	250K	374K	n/a	45K
<b>TOTALS:</b>	<b>351M</b>	<b>1,130M</b>	<b>1,000K</b>	<b>992K</b>	<b>40K</b>	<b>45K<sup>17</sup></b>

<sup>15</sup> These figures were compiled from the following sources: Matrix of Wins (2011-2015 Enacted Legislation), Annual Campaign Tallies, State Campaign Wins and Losses 2011-2015, Year-by-Year Overviews of State Campaign Agendas and Legislative Reports, and exchanges with M+R staff. Goals, successes, and losses were not tracked in an entirely consistent manner over the span of the National Campaign. Also, the National Campaign did not track bill numbers for legislative reforms that were not enacted, which made it more difficult to independently verify losses. This represents our best effort to tabulate the total number of reforms pursued, including but not limited to legislation, and how many of the reforms supported by the National Campaign were successful and unsuccessful. The actual successes may be slightly higher or lower.

<sup>16</sup> After 2013, M+R did not specify a goal for the Mistakes Kids Make Facebook page. Without a baseline from other juvenile justice groups at the time, M+R based the goal of 40,000 on previous communities they had built. However, growth of the page was limited due to the lack of advocacy-related asks that are ideal for social media. Nonetheless, Mistakes Kids Make became the largest Facebook community dedicated to juvenile justice.

<sup>17</sup> This figure is the size of the Mistakes Kids Make Facebook page at the end of the National Communications Effort, not the sum of each year.

Organizations and Individuals Engaged						
	Affinity Groups (Goal)	Affinity Groups (Actual)	JJ Partners (Goal)	JJ Partners (Actual)	Influential Messengers (Goal)	Influential Messengers (Actual)
2013	6 - 8	9	10 - 12	13	n/a	n/a
2014	1 - 2 <sup>18</sup>	0	4 - 8	8	n/a	n/a
2015	n/a	n/a	11 - 13	13	3	2
<b>TOTALS:</b>	<b>7 - 10</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>25 - 33<sup>19</sup></b>	<b>34</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>

Communications Assets and Capacity Building				
	Reports or Products (Goal)	Reports or Products (Actual)	Trainings (Goal)	Trainings (Actual)
2013	5 - 6 <sup>20</sup>	3	n/a	1 <sup>21</sup>
2014	2 - 3 <sup>22</sup>	3	2 - 3	0
2015	3 - 4 <sup>23</sup>	3 <sup>24</sup>	2 - 3	2
<b>TOTALS:</b>	<b>10 - 13</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>4 - 6</b>	<b>3</b>

<sup>18</sup> Based on limited engagement from affinity groups in 2013, M+R shifted its approach in 2014 to focus on deeper engagement with fewer groups and then suspended the affinity outreach program in mid-2014.

<sup>19</sup> The goals and actuals for number of juvenile justice partners supported were not necessarily cumulative, as they were split between continuing work with some groups and engaging new ones. However, for the sake of comparing goals to actuals, the numbers are totaled here.

<sup>20</sup> Source: Proposal for a Campaign to Reform Juvenile Justice Systems for Public Interest Projects (2013), August 24, 2012, pages 7-8.

<sup>21</sup> Though M+R did not set a goal for trainings in 2013, in October of that year it hosted a training webinar for the juvenile justice community to share best practices and findings from the National Communications Effort's social media growth. More background is available in M+R's Q4 2013 progress report to the MacArthur Foundation, page 11.

<sup>22</sup> This goal was revised downward from three to four reports to two to three. The original goal was in the Proposal for a Campaign to Reform Juvenile Justice Systems for Public Interest Projects (2013), August 24, 2012, pages 7-8. The amended goal was in the 2014 Juvenile Justice Communications Campaign overview, December 18, 2013, page 5.

<sup>23</sup> In the 2015 Public Interest Projects proposal, M+R proposed the development and release of one large MacArthur branded report. See Proposal for a Campaign to Reform Juvenile Justice Systems for Public Interest Projects (2015), September 4, 2014, page 13. However, in the quarterly progress reports for 2015, M+R also set a goal for two to three mini-products or other packaged content with juvenile justice partners. The total goal for 2015 reflects the combined count of the major report and the two to three mini-products.

<sup>24</sup> As noted in M+R's final progress report, M+R developed and released a major MacArthur-branded report in 2015 as well as a timeline of juvenile justice history for the Burns Institute in support of a report the organization released in 2015 and an interactive shackling map for the Campaign Against Indiscriminate Juvenile Shackling.

## Overarching Conclusion

Together the findings in the evaluation report point to one central conclusion about the National Campaign and National Communications Effort:

The National Campaign’s approach was effective, and it successfully accomplished its goal to accelerate the enactment of meaningful juvenile justice reforms in a large number of states. The National Campaign’s shortcomings were mainly tactical or situational rather than strategic in nature. The legislative and other gains achieved by the National Campaign will have a positive impact on young people and families in contact with the juvenile justice system and will help generate continuing momentum for policy changes in the future. In addition, increased receptiveness among lawmakers, the emergence of support among conservative lawmakers for reforms, and continued enthusiasm on the part of state-based groups as a result of the work of the National Campaign are positive indications that there is a “Fourth Wave of Juvenile Justice Reform.”

The National Communications Effort was most successful as a learning endeavor, and some aspects of the National Communications Effort were implemented well. For example, progress was made in shaping the juvenile justice narrative and reaching a broader audience. As an experimental and emergent strategy, it produced valuable lessons and demonstrated that an investment in communications can influence how an issue is framed and has the potential to advance policy goals. However, the decision to separate the National Campaign and the National Communications Effort limited the ability of the National Communications Effort to highlight the gains of the National Campaign and to provide a way for a new and engaged audience to channel their support for reform into meaningful action that could contribute to policy changes.

## Highlights from the Findings

### FINDING 01



Overall, the National Campaign was effective; it accelerated the widespread enactment of policies to reform state juvenile justice systems.

Based on the National Campaign's performance relative to its two main goals—number of reforms enacted and states worked in—it was successful and served as an accelerant. Over five years, the National Campaign made steady progress in advancing juvenile justice reforms and in blocking regressive measures. One or more reforms were enacted in 30 of the 37 states that the National Campaign worked in (81%), which exceeded the National Campaign's goal of 75%. Of the 313 reforms pursued with support from the National Campaign, 208 were successful, a 66% success rate.<sup>25</sup> In addition, 127 bills, court rules, and budget measures were enacted. There was broad agreement among respondents from states where juvenile justice reform efforts were only nascent or had stalled that the National Campaign had a catalytic effect.

### FINDING 02



The National Campaign was adept at advancing policy agendas that were determined locally, were primarily proactive in nature, and resulted in meaningful juvenile justice gains.

Empowering state-based groups and individuals to determine specific policy goals leveraged their expertise, ensured local ownership of the work, and respected the fact that meaningful juvenile justice reforms are not identical state-to-state. By not forcing a rigid policy agenda on the state groups, the National Campaign developed more trust and buy-in among state campaign stakeholders. Also, the National Campaign was skilled at playing both offense and defense; however, the locally selected reform agendas supported by the National Campaign were mostly comprised of proactive policy goals.<sup>26</sup> This is significant because it is generally easier to oppose measures and maintain the status quo than it is to successfully advocate for policy changes. Of the 313 reforms pursued and regressive measures opposed, 296 were proactive and 17 were defensive in nature. Almost two-thirds of the attempts to enact reforms were achieved, and virtually all of the efforts to block regressive policies were successful. The five categories of reforms most frequently enacted included:<sup>27</sup>

1. Measures to keep young people in juvenile court by raising the age of juvenile court jurisdiction, and to treat them as youth in court proceedings (adopted in 18 states)

<sup>25</sup> These figures were compiled from the following sources: Matrix of Wins (2011-2015 Enacted Legislation), Annual Campaign Tallies, State Campaign Wins and Losses 2011-2015, Year-by-Year Overviews of State Campaign Agendas and Legislative Reports, and exchanges with M+R staff. This represents our best effort to tabulate the total number of reforms pursued, including but not limited to legislation, and how many of the reforms supported by the National Campaign were successful. The actual successes may be slightly higher or lower.


<sup>26</sup> A proactive policy goal is defined in this report as one that would reform the juvenile justice system in a way that would save money, improve public safety, lower recidivism, keep young people out of the juvenile justice system, or increase alternatives to incarceration. Proactive goals included efforts to pass legislation that would roll back or revise punitive laws. Defensive goals are defined as efforts to block legislation or policies that would have represented a further step backward for youth and families in contact with the juvenile justice system.

<sup>27</sup> Source: The National Campaign to Reform State Juvenile Justice Systems 2011 - 2015 Report, September 23, 2015, page 1.

2. Reductions in incarceration through increased use of diversion and community-based programs (adopted in 14 states)
3. Improvements in the conditions of confinement (adopted in 10 states)
4. Increased access to counsel and improved court processes (adopted in 9 states)
5. Policies that prevent young people who are truant, defiant, or act out in school from being automatically sent into the juvenile justice system (adopted in 8 states)

The reforms pursued were substantive, and particularly meaningful changes to state juvenile justice systems were adopted in more than one-third of the states the National Campaign worked in. In 13 of the 37 states that the National Campaign worked in, particularly impressive gains were made, and state campaigns pursued and successfully advanced agendas that reflected both legislative and non-legislative goals.<sup>28</sup>

### Gains by State and by Type



<sup>28</sup> In assessing the significance of the gains made in each state, Grassroots Solutions considered the following: approximately how broadly the effects would be felt by youth and their families in the state, the total number of reforms enacted, and the landscape in which the state campaign was operating (i.e., how challenging was it to advance the reform agenda). In many of the big-win states, the age of juvenile court jurisdiction was raised. Because fiscal analyses of the impacts of reforms enacted were not conducted, determining how broadly the effects of reforms would be felt was a somewhat subjective exercise. Our conclusions were based on what we could glean about the reforms enacted from the documentation provided, coverage in the media (where available), and consultations with National Campaign staff at M+R.

## FINDING 03



The financial, strategic, and logistical resources provided by the National Campaign reflected local contexts and had an overwhelmingly positive, short-term impact on the advancement of state policy goals. Exceptions typically occurred in states where there were time constraints that prevented state campaigns from taking full advantage of the support offered.

The National Campaign’s assessment of what it would take to accelerate progress and achieve each state’s unique reform agenda was perceptive, and the resources and support it provided to strengthen state capacity were adaptable rather than “cookie cutter.” Based on M+R’s assessment of a variety of factors in each state—ripeness of the issue(s), availability of potent champions and allies in the public and private sectors, the political climate for reform, outlook within multiple branches of government, juvenile justice reform groups’ current capacity and track record, existence of local funding partners, the strategic value of the reforms pursued to the future success of the National Campaign, and the geographic region in question—the National Campaign provided tailored resources to bolster reform efforts. Although all forms of support provided by the National Campaign were reported to be helpful, resources for lobbying and strategic guidance received the highest praise. Also, the National Campaign’s support helped generate and leverage bipartisan backing for juvenile justice reforms. Prior to the National Campaign’s involvement, many local groups observed that their juvenile justice work was often cast as a “liberal” issue. Nine types of support comprised a framework that allowed the National Campaign to be responsive to local needs and opportunities.

TYPES OF SUPPORT PROVIDED BY THE NATIONAL CAMPAIGN <sup>29</sup>	# of States	% of States
Interviewed and contracted with lobbyist(s)	37	100%
Provided campaign advice and strategy ideas	33	89%
Interviewed and contracted with a policy coordinator and/or local advocate organization(s)	32*	86%
Identified key local stakeholders and facilitated discussion to confirm reform agenda	29	78%
Shared data and research on national trends and other states	26	70%
Facilitated high-level relationships with local champions and influencers	22	59%
Helped identify, recruit, and prep speakers to testify at hearings and/or made introductions to national juvenile justice experts where relevant	19	51%
Contracted with a media and communications consultant	15	41%
Other assistance (e.g., convened check-ins or funded polling, research, or web development)	12	32%

\* In six states—Arkansas, California, Georgia, Louisiana, Nevada, and Pennsylvania—the local policy coordinator was not under contract and did not receive funding from the National Campaign.

<sup>29</sup> The figures presented in the table are derived from the survey and informed by documentation Grassroots Solutions requested from M+R.

Being in the right place at the right time was essential to success. In some instances, the National Campaign’s support arrived too late to make a demonstrable difference in the first year, but helped to lay the foundation for the next year. In other cases, the National Campaign made the decision to work in a state after the session had already kicked off, so the groups and individuals involved scrambled on a compressed timeline to get a bill together, determine strategy, and assess the opposition.

## FINDING 04



Although each state’s context and goals were unique, several factors contributed significantly to achieving juvenile justice policy gains. Having influential champions, capable lobbyists with strong relationships with targeted decision makers, and support on both sides of the political aisle were especially important to the enactment of reforms. However, no single variable typically propelled state campaigns to “win”; it was the interplay of influential factors and having the right people involved that were critical for success.

First, success was predicated on having a feasible set of locally determined reform goals or solutions to promote. Secondly, the presence of nine contextual factors contributed significantly to the enactment of juvenile justice reforms. The most relevant factors for success included: legislative and gubernatorial champion(s), capable lobbyists and relationships with key legislators, bipartisan support, communications strategy and effective messaging, strong impetus or timeliness for reform, engaged allies (groups and individuals), the involvement of respected and knowledgeable local nonprofit advocacy organizations, access to juvenile justice research and policy expertise, capacity and ability to coordinate and manage reform efforts, an active grassroots base of supporters, broad public awareness, and cost-savings analyses. Three of the nine contextual factors—legislative and gubernatorial champion(s), capable lobbyists and relationships with key legislators, bipartisan support—were perceived as the most influential in advancing or inhibiting state campaigns from advancing their reform agendas.

Given that each state had its own reform agenda and landscape, all of the factors cited were influential, and their interplay mattered. Grassroots support, broad public awareness, and cost-savings analyses were influential, but considerably less so than the other six factors explored. Juvenile justice was routinely described by interviewees as an issue that best lent itself to an “under the dome” strategy. That said, in certain cases, the ability to apply grassroots pressure was very valuable. It is worth noting that lobbyists and advocates who don’t have experience with grassroots engagement and mobilization often don’t know how to effectively employ it as part of an integrated strategy or undervalue its potential. Also, the presence of well-established coalitions did not always jibe well with the National Campaign’s approach. Significant gains were often made in states where there was some local advocacy expertise and commitment to advancing reforms, but not necessarily a long-established coalition focused on juvenile justice issues.

SUCCESS FACTORS	Present in Most States Where Reforms Were Enacted?	Present in Most States Where No or Small Gains Were Made?
<b>MOST INFLUENTIAL FACTORS</b>		
Legislative and gubernatorial champion(s)	YES	NO
Capable lobbyists and relationships with key legislators	YES	YES
Bipartisan support	YES	NO
Communications strategy and effective messaging	YES	NO
Strong impetus or timeliness for reform <sup>30</sup>	YES	NO
<b>INFLUENTIAL FACTORS</b>		
Engaged allies (e.g., judges, prosecutors, county administrators, department of corrections)	YES	NO
Respected and knowledgeable local nonprofit advocacy organization(s)	YES	YES
Access to juvenile justice research and policy expertise	YES	YES
Capacity and ability to coordinate and manage reform efforts	YES	YES
<b>SOMEWHAT INFLUENTIAL FACTORS</b>		
Active grassroots base of supporters	NO	NO
Broad public awareness	NO	NO
Cost-savings analysis	NO	NO

## FINDING 05



Although the National Campaign’s theory of change and approach remained largely consistent from 2011 to 2015, it was adaptable to changing contexts and lessons learned (positive and negative). Its flexibility and responsiveness yielded two important dividends: 1) a wider variety of ambitious reform packages introduced and enacted and 2) better relationships with organizations poised to continue with work once the National Campaign was no longer involved.

The decision to make multi-year investments in state campaigns enabled the National Campaign to balance its dual aims of accelerating reforms in a large number of states and enacting meaningful reforms. After the first year of operations, National Campaign staff at M+R rightly observed that it would take longer than one year to achieve reforms in many states. Multi-year commitments would allow the National Campaign to develop two-

<sup>30</sup> Examples of strong impetus or timeliness for reform included: the release of a new study, an economic imperative, opportune moment in the electoral cycle, and visibility of a juvenile justice case in the media.

year strategies, laying the foundation for reforms in the first year that could be achieved in the second, or to take advantage of successes in the first year that could pave the way for further (often more ambitious) reforms thereafter. Also, choosing to consistently provide funding for local nonprofits and advocacy organizations (where it was applicable) engendered goodwill and contributed to better working relationships among the groups and individuals involved in each state. One of the most pointed critiques of the National Campaign after 2011 and 2012 was that it did not fund local organizations (although in most states, funding was available).

The National Campaign's support for omnibus legislation and agendas comprised of multiple reforms helped state campaigns to achieve a variety of juvenile justice gains in a short period of time. The pursuit of multiple reforms often broadened the appeal among local allies and state campaign stakeholders and made compromise more palatable. Even if some aspects of the reform agenda were unappealing to some local stakeholders, there was something to like. With encouragement from the National Campaign, state campaigns developed a successful track record of advocating for more reforms per legislative session, either by advocating for multiple juvenile justice bills or for an omnibus package of reforms. Additionally, supporting and expanding legislative efforts to abolish indiscriminate shackling of young people was another illustration of the National Campaign's ability to seize emergent opportunities and adapt to changing contexts.



While the National Campaign's involvement produced collateral benefits for local advocates beyond policy changes, the boost to state-level capacity was short-term, and it is not clear whether gains made will necessarily be sustainable.

The resources and support provided by the National Campaign produced secondary benefits that extended beyond policy changes and increased the potential that additional reforms will be made following the National Campaign's departure. Collateral benefits mentioned most frequently by respondents included: new relationships among local nonprofits, professional lobbyists, and communications experts; higher trust levels among some state-based groups and advocates; and greater awareness of juvenile justice issues (especially among lawmakers).

The National Campaign strengthened short-term capacity at the state level, but it did not necessarily improve local stakeholders' long-term power or ability to advocate for reforms or protect gains. It is important to acknowledge that the National Campaign was always a time-limited endeavor, and its contributions were short-term by design. From the beginning, the National Campaign focused on accelerating wins, and it accomplished meaningful legislative gains. However, based on the materials and interview data that were reviewed, when the National Campaign launched, not much consideration was given to what it would ideally like to see happen after its departure. From the materials and respondents' feedback, it did not appear that the National Campaign created or implemented transition plans or steps.<sup>31</sup> Additionally, the decision on the part of the National Campaign to operate (mostly) independently of national juvenile justice organizations was intentional and helped it remain agile, but it missed an opportunity to strengthen or make connections between national and state groups. Nonprofits without strong connections to the national juvenile justice community could have benefited from connections to national organizations that could have provided longer-term strategic advice and support.

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<sup>31</sup> In a few instances, respondents reported that progress would be "undone" following the National Campaign's departure and that opposition to reforms may emerge as a result of the National Campaign's success. However, with the data at Grassroots Solutions' disposal, it was difficult to independently verify the extent to which the gains made were threatened or reversed. It is worth noting that it was not an expectation that the National Campaign track where legislative gains were rolled back. In the future, monitoring and having access to this type of information would help to better assess the sustainability of the gains made.

## FINDING 07



The main strengths of the National Campaign’s approach were that it was practical, flexible, and produced meaningful results relatively quickly through the passage of legislation. The chief downsides of the approach were that, by design, the National Campaign and its funders were not particularly visible, it did not appeal broadly to other funders, and it did not necessarily enhance state capacity beyond the short-term (as noted in Finding 6).

The National Campaign demonstrated that by being focused (on juvenile justice and mainly legislative gains) it was possible to achieve significant, incremental policy changes relatively quickly. Because juvenile justice is largely a state-level matter, concentrating on legislative gains was one of the surest ways to have an immediate and positive impact on young people and families who came into contact with the system. Unlike many local nonprofit organizations that supported agendas broader than juvenile justice, the National Campaign could direct its lobbyists and communications professionals to concentrate on enacting reforms that would save money, improve public safety, lower recidivism, keep young people out of the juvenile justice system, and increase alternatives to incarceration.

Additionally, the National Campaign applied a practical lens, and its willingness to compromise was integral to the National Campaign’s success in accelerating the enactment of juvenile justice reforms. In several states, bills would not have come to fruition had the National Campaign maintained a rigid posture about what constituted success. Respondents acknowledged that compromise often meant that not everyone involved in the state campaign was satisfied—particularly organizations or individuals that had been working on juvenile justice issues the longest—but most ultimately recognized that adhering to an unwavering reform agenda would not produce the desired results. In some instances, packaging reforms or the National Campaign’s multi-year investments in states helped overcome local resistance to compromise.

The low-profile nature of the National Campaign and its funders was a mixed blessing. Having a local organization and allies serve as the public face of the state campaigns was a sound strategic decision, but because the National Campaign and its funders were one step removed, they did not get as much publicity (or credit) as they could have. At the same time, the National Campaign could have done more to tout the collective accomplishments of the state campaigns it supported. Maintaining a low profile is not necessarily at odds with doing more storytelling, which could have had significant benefits. In particular, by not connecting the National Campaign more explicitly to the National Communications Effort, an opportunity was missed to broaden the national dialogue about juvenile justice reform and foster the sense that each state campaign was part of a “national wave.” Finally, wariness about legislative advocacy and engaging in lobbying made it hard for the National Campaign to attract the “big tent” of funders and nonprofits that it originally envisioned.

## FINDING 08



The widespread policy changes achieved with the support provided by the National Campaign contributed to momentum that had been building nationwide since 2007. Although it may be too soon to tell, increased receptiveness among lawmakers, the emergence of support among conservative lawmakers for reforms, and continued enthusiasm on the part of state-based groups are positive indications that there is a “Fourth Wave of Juvenile Justice Reform.”

Interest in and appetite for overturning harsh, ineffective, and expensive practices and replacing them with policies that keep communities safe while helping young people grow into responsible adults have no doubt increased since the National Campaign entered the field. The National Campaign infused resources and valuable strategic assistance into a landscape in which momentum for reforms was growing. It played a role in accelerating reforms and expanding enthusiasm among lawmakers to address policies that have led to an increasing number of young people tried in criminal court and incarcerated.


Rising support among conservative lawmakers for reforms is another positive indication of the Fourth Wave and affirms the positive impact of the National Campaign’s contributions. Its help in leveraging bipartisan support to enact legislation between 2011 and 2015 was built on the lessons from Models for Change. At the same time, although conditions may be riper for reform than they have been in a decade, and excitement exists, it is unclear who will take up the charge to lead on juvenile justice issues nationally. As the MacArthur Foundation and National Campaign discovered, there is a lot of potential to accelerate policy changes, but it takes leadership and the infusion of additional resources to “move the ball forward.”

## FINDING 09



The National Communications Effort successfully inserted a new narrative about juvenile justice in the media coverage and social media conversations it generated. It also significantly elevated the profile and influence of associated spokespeople in the media. The combined success of the National Communications Effort’s messages and messengers appeared to influence the broader narrative about juvenile justice in both national media and social media.

The National Communications Effort generated high-quality media coverage and social media conversations about juvenile justice that highlighted 1) problems caused by outdated and ineffective policies, 2) the need for solutions that balance accountability with rehabilitation, and 3) the young people who deserve a justice system that accounts for their differences from adults. These three core message tracks appeared much more frequently in the National Communications Effort’s news stories and Twitter activity than in non-affiliated media coverage and Tweets about juvenile justice.



Additionally, the National Communications Effort positioned its spokespeople as go-to experts and resources for reporters covering juvenile justice. Over the duration of the National Communications Effort, the number of spokespeople’s quotes or mentions in media coverage increased by nearly 125%. The reports released by the National Communications Effort created critical media opportunities for positioning juvenile justice advocates as experts on the issue and resources for media. In 2014, the year when the National Communications Effort pursued a “hybrid” approach of report development and capacity building, there was a 55% increase in spokespeople quotes from the previous year. With this approach, the National Communications Effort both created news moments for spokespeople and inserted them into breaking news.

Although the National Communications Effort did not set out to shift the broader media landscape on juvenile justice issues, it contributed to a notable increase in the amount of national media coverage and Twitter conversations about juvenile justice. It may have also influenced, to some degree, the content of the broader media landscape. By the end of the National Communications Effort, the core message tracks not only appeared in more stories in the national media landscape, but they also appeared repeatedly in those stories.

**FINDING 10**

Key factors for successfully engaging the media and advancing a new narrative included publicizing reform solutions, highlighting the lived experiences of adolescents in the juvenile justice system, and focusing on the system’s disproportionate impact on certain groups.

All of the reports released by the National Communications Effort, whether problems- or solutions-oriented, secured news coverage. However, the reports that packaged and positioned successful reform efforts as part of a growing trend were the most successful in garnering media coverage. For example, “The Comeback States” report—which revealed a significant reduction in youth incarceration and examined the solutions that contributed to that reduction in different states—generated significantly more news stories than any other report developed

by the National Communications Effort. The sequel to that report, “The Comeback and Coming-From-Behind States,” generated the second highest number of media hits. In fact, the media hits generated by these two reports (180 in total) exceeded the media hits of all other reports combined (105 total).

Additionally, the National Communications Effort’s work to identify and cultivate storytellers paid important dividends. Through ongoing work with partner organizations, the National Communications Effort identified several individuals in 2015 who had compelling personal stories that illustrated and humanized the need for reform. These stories were leveraged for high-impact earned media coverage in outlets that reached the National Communications Effort’s target audiences. The National Communications Effort also leveraged the media’s interest in the lived experience of children in the juvenile justice system through its rapid response work. These moments yielded high-value earned media coverage when the National Communications Effort was able to quickly line up spokespeople who could offer a new or novel perspective on breaking news.

## FINDING 11



The National Communications Effort used several channels to reach and increase awareness among its target audiences, which was important because different audiences responded to different channels. The strategy to reach young people and parents through the Mistakes Kids Make Facebook page was largely successful. The juvenile justice community most clearly responded to the National Communications Effort’s earned media coverage and Twitter activity.

The National Communications Effort successfully attracted and built a Facebook audience in which the majority of people were either between the ages of 18 and 24 or 35 and 50—the age ranges that corresponded to the primary target audiences. On Twitter, most of the users who engaged with the National Communications Effort in some way were involved in the juvenile justice community, most likely as advocates or practitioners. Based on the National Communications Effort’s earned media coverage in a wide array of outlets, we can safely assume it reached people who comprised its target audiences, as well as others. Of the 321 news stories generated by the National Communications Effort, 87% ran in mainstream media outlets with general readerships. Though these placements succeeded in making juvenile justice more of a mainstream issue than it had been before, they do not indicate the extent to which the National Communications Effort reached its target audiences, because it is impossible to isolate specific audiences from a general readership.

While it’s clear that the National Communications Effort largely reached its target audiences and increased their awareness of juvenile justice issues, analysis of engagement data revealed some lessons to consider for future communications work. The rationale behind selecting young people and parents as target audiences was that they “should care” and “can do something about it”—but the National Communications Effort was largely unable to provide that “something” for its audiences to do.<sup>32</sup> This challenge also hindered the National Communications Effort from engaging affinity groups—organizations whose followers aligned with the primary target audiences—to promote the Mistakes Kids Make campaign and content.

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<sup>32</sup> As noted on page 3, the MacArthur Foundation, in consultation with the National Campaign, decided to make the National Communications Effort complementary to the National Campaign rather than connected to it. Furthermore, given that reform goals or solutions for each state campaign were determined locally, the Foundation chose not to have a call to action.

## FINDING 12



Moments when the National Communications Effort was able to directly support reform efforts, or generate media coverage at the state level, showed the greatest potential for helping position a Fourth Wave of Juvenile Justice Reform.

Although it was not the intent or objective of the National Communications Effort to directly contribute to policy reform, the MacArthur Foundation was interested in understanding what could be learned about the impact of the National Communications Effort on reform efforts. When the National Communications Effort elevated reform successes in state juvenile justice systems, its work showed signs of accelerating or softening the ground for reform. For example, the National Campaign states that were featured in the “The Comeback States” and the “The Comeback and Coming-From-Behind States” reports achieved big gains at nearly twice the rate of other National Campaign states. To be sure, these reports featured states where reform had already taken root, and success begets success. However, this correlation suggests that more closely linking the National Communications Effort to the National Campaign could have helped advance the work of the National Campaign.

BerlinRosen’s analysis of the media coverage generated by the National Communications Effort, as well as the broader media landscape, revealed a stark difference between the way that state media and national media covered the same report or news moment, indicating that state media narratives on juvenile justice were in greater need of a shift than the national media narrative. In state outlets, problems-oriented messaging accounted for 46% of the narrative; in national media, it accounted for only 39%. Kids-oriented messaging constituted just 21% of the narrative in state outlets; in national outlets, it constituted 31%. A review of earned media coverage confirmed that messaging about young people being different from adults was notably less prevalent in state outlets than in national outlets. The National Communications Effort had the biggest impact on state-level media coverage when it developed and released reports, especially if those reports included state-by-state comparisons. Although the reports were time- and resource-intensive, they were key to landing media coverage in the states and shifting the narrative to be more favorable toward reform.

## Implications

After 20 years, the MacArthur Foundation announced that its support for work in juvenile justice is coming to a close, and the National Campaign will conclude in 2017. Through a grant to the Rockefeller Family Fund in 2016, the MacArthur Foundation is supporting a final year of state campaign operations in 15 states. In reflecting on the implications of the National Campaign and National Communications Effort, several lessons emerged that may be useful to the juvenile justice community, funding partners, and possibly other issue advocacy efforts.

First and foremost, the MacArthur Foundation is well positioned to speak to the value of generating bipartisan backing for juvenile justice reforms and can serve as a powerful educator about the ways in which foundations can support advocacy. Additional lessons learned from the National Campaign and National Communications Effort that may be of value to the juvenile justice community and Foundation include, but aren’t limited to, the following:

- With a national, multi-year initiative, there is value in maintaining a laser-like focus on being accountable to one big goal, but then being responsive to each state’s context and willing to adapt and compromise.
- It often took two years or two sessions to enact big changes: one year to lay the groundwork, prepare a state campaign, craft smart bill language, and develop relationships, and one year to see the reform goals come to fruition.

- Even if legislation is the main focus, be more intentional about how legislative and non-legislative reform goals can comprise a more comprehensive agenda. The reported efforts to advance policy changes at the “municipal, county, or regional level” that took place while the National Campaign was involved in various states did not necessarily happen by design. The synergies were mainly a happy accident. Figure out what support is most needed in order to tackle non-legislative reforms, especially because it is the kind of work that can be supported with 501c3 funds, and, in some states, is much easier to advance.
- To create a media narrative that both makes the case for and supports a reform movement, it is important to craft an integrated media strategy that generates coverage at both the state and national levels. Media coverage is crucial at the state level—that is the arena where reforms are enacted—but it is also where the media narrative is less favorable for reform. Media coverage at the national level is crucial for demonstrating growing momentum and shaping the views of thought leaders and influencers. Developing content and other narrative strategies that package gains, compare states, and highlight emerging trends is a key way to achieve both state and national media attention.
- There is value in identifying and cultivating individuals who are willing to share their stories with media—and policymakers—about their experiences with the juvenile justice system. Their stories illustrate the long-term impact and consequences of the problems that persist in the juvenile justice system and remind audiences that individual children have nothing less than their lives at stake. Most importantly, personal stories can help create a sense of urgency among policymakers and the media that change needs to happen. Whenever possible, prioritize and develop systems to identify and activate people who can tell their story as part of media outreach and report releases.
- Plan for what you want to leave behind at the beginning, and embed learning and evaluation activities into the initiative or campaign design from the outset and establish a baseline. Monitor rollbacks and consider providing limited transition funding to support implementation. Also, funds permitting, consider conducting a fiscal analysis of the financial impacts of future campaigns.
- Integrate communications strategies with policy campaigns. Communications is fundamentally about telling a story, and the policy work provides the content of that story. The introduction, movement, passage—or even defeat—of policy propels a story forward. When designed and executed well, communications strategies that support policy work at both the local and national levels can create a virtuous cycle of momentum and narrative change that is necessary to spark and sustain a movement.
- Consider applying the success factors identified through this evaluation to assess whether conditions are ripe to pursue legislative reforms and evaluate future juvenile justice campaigns (and possibly other legislative efforts). These success factors largely dovetail with the conditions viewed by researchers and advocacy practitioners as essential to successful policy campaigns and they appear in advocacy assessment tools created by the Stanford Social Innovation Review, Alliance for Justice, and other organizations.<sup>33</sup> However, the success factors presented here reflect what we learned specifically about juvenile justice through the work of the National Campaign. The success factors can function as a framework for juvenile justice advocates and grantmakers to look at conditions in each state and score them from “not present” to “present.” For other initiatives or projects that involve advocacy, applying this type of framework from the outset can increase the consistency of assessments and evaluations of advocacy efforts across states and campaigns.

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<sup>33</sup> For example, the nine conditions described in “Assessing Advocacy” published by the Stanford Social Innovation Review in 2013 include: functioning venue(s) for adoption, open policy window, feasible solution, dynamic master plan, strong campaign leader(s), influential support coalition, mobilized public, powerful inside champions, and clear implementation path.

CHECKLIST OF SUCCESS FACTORS*	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Feasible set of locally determined reform goals or solutions
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Legislative and gubernatorial champion(s)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Capable lobbyists and relationships with key legislators
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Bipartisan support
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Strong impetus or timeliness for reform
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Communications strategy and effective messaging
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Engaged allies (e.g., judges, prosecutors, county administrators, department of corrections)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Involvement of respected and knowledgeable local nonprofit advocacy organizations
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Access to juvenile justice research and policy expertise
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Capacity and ability to coordinate and manage reform efforts
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Active grassroots base of supporters
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Public awareness
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Cost-savings analysis

\* This checklist of success factors relates to Finding 4 and stems from our analysis of the factors that contributed most significantly toward advancing juvenile justice reform in each state.

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## Thank You

It has been a pleasure working with the MacArthur Foundation to design and conduct this evaluation. Grassroots Solutions and BerlinRosen hope that the findings and lessons learned are useful and informative for the MacArthur Foundation, the Funders' Collaborative, National Campaign and National Communications Effort staff and stakeholders, and the broader juvenile justice community.